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Katz and Klotz: CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK

People v. Leon'
(decided February 19, 2008)
Jose Leon was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree
and endangering the welfare of a child.2 He was sentenced to a term
of fifteen years to life as a persistent violent offender resulting from
two prior convictions for violent felonies.

The Appellate Division,

First Department, unanimously affirmed.4 Leon appealed to the New
York Court of Appeals, arguing that his right of confrontation as
granted by the United States Constitution5 and the New York Constitution 6 was violated at his sentencing hearing when he was denied the
ability to confront the author of a report who had certified that the defendant's fingerprints matched those found on two fingerprint cards
which listed two prior convictions. The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that Leon's constitutional rights were not violated
because the right to confrontation is a "trial right" that does not apply

1 People v. Leon (Leon Ii), 884 N.E.2d

1037 (N.Y. 2008).

2 People v. Leon (Leon 1), 827 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2007).
3 Id.; Leon II, 884 N.E.2d at 1038.
4 Leon I, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
6 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6, states, in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court whatever the
party accused shall be allowed to ... be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ;
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.15(17)(a)(McKinney 2008), which states, in pertinent part, that
at a persistent violent felony hearing, "[the] burden of proof is upon the people and a finding
that the defendant has been subject to a predicate violent felony conviction must be based
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence admissible under the rules applicable to a
trial on the issue of guilt."
7 Leon II, 884 N.E.2d at 1038.
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at sentencing hearings. 8
Leon was convicted of sexually abusing a thirteen-year-old. 9
The hearing court determined that Leon was "a persistent violent felony offender" after finding that Leon had previously been convicted
of first-degree manslaughter in both 1976 and 1983.0 A public official compared two fingerprint cards that bore identical identification
numbers for a "Jose Leon" who had been convicted in 1976 and
1983, and determined that the fingerprints on the cards matched."
Leon claimed that he was the same "Jose Leon" that had been convicted in 1976, but not the same "Jose Leon" identified for the 1983
conviction.12 Relying on Crawford v. Washington,'3 Leon asserted he
was denied the right to confront the official who had compared the
fingerprint cards at his sentencing hearing, a right granted in both the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and by operation of
New

York

Criminal

Procedure

Law

400.15(7)(a)

("CPL

400.15(7)(a)"). 14 Leon argued that the trial right to confrontation is
incorporated into CPL 400.15(7)(a)."15
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals addressed

Id. at 1039.
9 Id. at 1038.
1o Id.

1 Id.
12 Leon II, 884 N.E.2d at 1039.
13 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
14 Leon II, 884 N.E.2d at 1038. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.15(7)(a), which states,

in pertinent part: "[tihe burden of proof is upon the people and a finding that the defendant
has been subject to a predicate violent felony conviction must be based upon proof ...by
evidence admissible under the rules applicable .. "
15 Leon II, 884 N.E.2d at 1039. Implicit in this argument is that Leon was denied his right

of confrontation as granted by the New York Constitution, Article 1,Section 6.
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whether Crawford applied at sentencing hearings.16 In Crawford,the
defendant stabbed a man who allegedly attempted to rape his wife.' 7
Subsequently, the police arrested the defendant and twice interrogated both the defendant and his wife.' 8 Defendant's wife confirmed
the defendant's story except for her account of the fight, and whether
the victim had drawn a weapon before the defendant had assaulted
him.' 9 The defendant was charged with assault and attempted murder, to which he claimed self-defense.2 0 At trial, his wife did not testify because of marital privilege; however, the prosecution played a
tape recording of the wife's statement to the police which described
the stabbing incident. 2'

Accordingly, the defendant had not been

given the opportunity to cross-examine. 2
The Supreme Court, relying on Ohio v. Roberts,2 3 stated that
the Confrontation Clause "does not bar admission of an unavailable
witness's statement against a criminal defendant if the statement [is]
reliab[le]," reliability being found if the evidence is either a "firmly
rooted hearsay exception" or bears "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." 24 The trial court admitted the statement, finding it

16 Id.
'" Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.

18 Id.
19 Id.

20 Id. at 40.
21 Id. According to Washington state law, the marital "privilege does not extend to a
spouse's out-of-court statements ...

so the State sought to introduce Sylvia's tape-recorded

statements to the police as evidence that the stabbing was not self-defense." Id. (internal citation
22
23
24

omitted).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
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to be trustworthy.25 The Washington Court of Appeals reversed after
determining that the statement was not trustworthy for several reasons, including the fact that the statement contradicted a prior statement, and because the witness had admitted to having her eyes closed
when the stabbing occurred.26 However, the defendant's conviction
was reinstated by the Washington Supreme Court which found that
the wife's statement was reliable.27
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided whether
the prosecution's use of the wife's statement to the police violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.28 The defendant argued that
the Roberts test, which allows an "out-of-court statement ... so long
as it has adequate indicia of reliability

. . .

meaning of the Confrontation Clause.,

29

, strays from the original

After considering the his-

torical background of the Confrontation Clause, 30 the Court articulated two main inferences about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment: first, the Confrontation Clause was aimed to protect against the
"use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused"; 31 and
second, "the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity
for cross-examination.,

32

Thus, the Court reasoned that a prior op-

25 id.
26 Id. at41.
27 id.
28 Id. at 42.
29 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.

'o Id. at 43-52.
31 Id. at 50.
32 Id. at 53-54.
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portunity to cross-examine is a requisite condition for admitting testimonial statements.33 The Court further reasoned that the rationale
behind Roberts departed from the historical principles not only because it was too broad, in that the analysis did not differentiate between ex-parte and non-ex-parte hearsay, but also because it was too
narrow, in that it admitted statements that contained ex-parte testimony upon a "mere finding of reliability.,

34

The Court concluded

that the State's admission of the wife's statement against the defendant violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.35
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed
with the majority's decision to overrule Roberts.36 He believed that
while the Framers were concerned with the accused's inability to
confront sworn affidavits and depositions, they may not have been
concerned about the "broader category of testimonial statements" that
the majority's new rule encompassed.37 Chief Justice Rehnquist did
not see a reason for the majority to establish a distinction between
testimonial and nontestimonial statements, noting that unsworn testimonial statements were treated the same way as nontestimonial
statements at common law, and that precedence has shown that some
nontestimonial statements admitted as evidence can raise confrontation concerns as well. 38 Chief Justice Rehnquist also expressed his

" Id. at 55.
14 Crawford,541 U.S. at 60.
" Id. at 68.
36 Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
" Id. at71.
38 id.
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discontent over the fact that the majority did not provide a "comprehensive definition" of the kind of testimony the new rule would encompass, thus leaving prosecutors in the dark.3 9

Chief Justice

Rehnquist's concurrence brings into question the extent of protection
that the Framers intended, and whether the protection was intended to
encompass only testimonial statements.
Crawford represents the rule that "where testimonial statements" are involved, the U.S. Constitution requires a right of confrontation.40 If Crawford applied at sentencing hearings, then Leon
was denied both his federal and state constitutional rights "to be confronted with the witnesses against him., 41 However, the New York
Court of Appeals determined that "sentencing hearings are not trial
prosecutions.

,,42

The court interpreted Crawford as addressing "tes-

43
timonial hearsay at trial.,

When interpreting whether Crawford applies at sentencing
hearings, the New York Court of Appeals looked to the Supreme
Court's decision in Barber v. Page.44 In Barber, the Court addressed
whether a defendant was deprived of his right of confrontation when
the key evidence used against him was the testimony of a witness
who was incarcerated at the time of trial.45 At a preliminary hearing,
both the defendant and the witness were charged with armed rob-

'9
40
41
42

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75-76.
Id. at 68-69.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
Leon II, 884 N.E.2d at 1039.

43 id.

44 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
41 Id. at 720.
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bery. 46 The witness's testimony at the preliminary hearing incriminated the defendant, but the defendant's attorney did not crossexamine the witness. 47 Subsequently, at trial, the court allowed the
introduction of the transcript of the witness's testimony from the preliminary hearing because the witness was incarcerated in a federal
prison and unavailable to testify. 48 The jury convicted the defendant,

and the conviction was affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals.49
"The defendant sought federal habeas corpus," arguing that
the state deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation
at his trial by using the transcript of the witness's testimony. 50 The
district court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected defendant's argument. 51 However, the Supreme Court reversed, noting
that the primary purpose of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause " 'was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits
used ...

. . .

being

in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of

the witness.' ,52 The prosecution argued that the introduction of the
transcript fell within an exception to the confrontation requirement as
the witness was unavailable at the time of trial, and the defendant had
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing, even though he did not avail himself of it.53

46 Id.
47

Id.

48 Id.

49 Barber,390 U.S. at 720-21.
50 Id. at 721.
51 Id.

52 Id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).
51 Id. at 722.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 [2012], Art. 8

1164

TOURO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 25

The Court determined that regardless of the fact that the defendant did not cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing,
the right to confrontation applies mainly at trial because a trial encompasses cross-examination and observation of witnesses by a jury,
whereas a preliminary hearing serves the more limited function of determining whether probable cause exists to go to trial. 5 4 Thus, while
there may be occasions in which the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the Confrontation Clause
because a witness is unavailable,55 in Barber, the prosecution made
no effort to obtain the presence of the witness at trial, and the defendant was denied his right to confrontation at trial. 6
In Pointer v. Texas,57 the Supreme Court recognized that "the
right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's
constitutional goal., 58 In Pointer,the defendant was arrested for robbery.59 The robbery victim testified at the preliminary hearing, identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery. 60 The defendant, who did not have an attorney present at the preliminary hearing,
did not cross-examine the victim. 6 1 The victim subsequently moved
to California and was not present at the trial. 62 At the trial, the prosecution offered the transcript of the victim's testimony at the prelimi54 Barber, 390 U.S. at 725.

" Id. at 725-26.
56 Id. at 723.
17 380 U.S. 400 (1965).

51 Id. at 405.
'9 Id. at401.
60 Id.
61 Id.

62 Pointer,380 U.S. at 401.
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nary hearing as evidence, and the trial judge allowed the evidence,
reasoning that the defendant had been given an opportunity to crossexamine the witness at the preliminary hearing. 63 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed.64
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
right to confrontation is a fundamental right granted by the Sixth
Amendment, and is read into the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to
states. 65 The Court concluded that the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confront and cross-examine the witness at trial had been "unquestionably denied.,

66

Additionally, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Luciano,67 addressed whether the Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses applies at sentencing hearings.68 In Luciano, the
defendant had an altercation with his girlfriend at a bus stop in Rhode
Island. 69 A witness, who had seen the defendant aim a gun at the defendant's girlfriend, flagged down a police officer to tell him what he
had seen. 70 The police officer apprehended the defendant based upon
the description given by the witness. 7' At the defendant's sentencing
hearing, the police officer testified concerning the witness's activities, and the prosecution offered both evidence of the detective's report containing the statement given by the witness, and evidence of
63 Id. at 401-02.

64 Id. at 402.
65 Id. at 403.

66 Id. at 406.
67 414 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 2005).
68 Id. at 178.
69 Id. at 175-76.

'o Id. at 176.
71 Id.
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the witness's testimony before the grand jury.72 The defendant argued that his inability to cross-examine the witness at his sentencing
hearing violated his right to confrontation.73 The prosecution had not
provided any evidence that the witness had been unavailable for the
trial, nor had the prosecution attempted to secure his presence.74
The First Circuit looked at its prior decisional law which held
that the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses did not apply at
sentencing hearings, 5 and noted that other circuits shared the same
view.76 The court further stated that the decision in Crawford did not
change its analysis that the right to confront witnesses is not applicable at sentencing hearings.77 Thus, the court concluded that "there is
no Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right at sentencing" hearings. 78
Similarly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in United
States v. Martinez,79 determined that "the Sixth Amendment does not
bar the consideration of hearsay testimony at sentencing proceedings. , 80 In Martinez, the defendant was involved in an altercation
which resulted in a gun fight. 81 The defendant pled guilty "to unlaw72 Luciano, 414 F.3d at 176.

71 Id. at 178.
74 id.

75 Id. (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 336 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2003)).

76 Id. at 178-79 (citing United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Francis, 39 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d
1365, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1508-16 (6th Cir.

1992) (en banc); United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 401 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United
States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102-03 (3d Cir. 1990)).
77 Luciano, 414 F.3d at 179.
78 Id.

79 413 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2005).
80 Id. at 244.
I' at 240.
Id.
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ful possession of a firearm., 8 2 At his sentencing hearing, the district
court allowed a police detective's testimony as to the events surrounding the altercation, partially based upon his interviews with as83
sorted witnesses, even though the testimony was hearsay.
The court emphasized that both its own decisions and those of
the Supreme Court have consistently held that the Confrontation
Clause does not apply at sentencing hearings and does not prevent
testimonial hearsay. 84 Once a defendant has been found guilty, the
sentencing judge is not limited to evidence obtained by examination
and cross-examination of witnesses, when making the punishment
determination. 85
However, in United States v. Fortier,86 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals reached the opposite result, finding that a defendant's right to confrontation was violated when unreliable hearsay
evidence was considered at his sentencing hearing. 87 In Fortier,the
defendant, as part of a plea bargain, "pleaded guilty to... possession
with intent to distribute 139 grams of cocaine" in exchange for the
dismissal of two other counts against him. 88 One of the dismissed
counts was for possession of 249 grams of cocaine acquired from a
confidential informant who alleged that the defendant had possessed
the cocaine and intended to distribute it. 89

82

A presentence report

Id. at 241.

83 id.

Martinez, 413 F.3d at 242.
Id. (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-51 (1949)).
86 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1990).
84

85

87 Id. at 101.
88

Id. at 101-02.

89 Id.
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stated that defendant had possessed 388 grams of cocaine, which included the 249 grams of cocaine of the dismissed charge. 90 The district court sentenced defendant to twenty-seven months in prison
based upon the sentencing report's data. 91
The defendant argued that consideration of the 249 grams of
cocaine when calculating his sentence had violated his right to confrontation because the district court had failed to make "an independent finding that the hearsay was reliable." 92 The presentence report
was based upon ambiguous taped conversations and an informant's
statements that a third person had informed him that the drugs belonged to the defendant.93
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the reliability of the factfinding process is questionable when there is no proper confrontation
of witnesses. 94 The court reasoned that courts may rely on presentencing reports only when "the facts in the presentence report are not
disputed by the defendant.

95

Since no finding of reliability was

made concerning the testimony of the informant or the admission of
the taped conversations, the use of the presentence report violated the
defendant's right to confrontation.96
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, when addressing the argument that
a defendant's right to confrontation was violated at a sentencing hearing by the withholding of presentencing investigative reports, the
9' Id. at 102.
91 Fortier,911 F.2d. at 102.
92 Id. at 102-03.

9' Id. at 103.
94

Id.

95 Id.

96 Fortier,911 F.2d. at 103-04.
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New York Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion as the majority of the aforementioned courts. 97 The court stated that "neither
the Supreme Court nor this court has ever held, nor do we now believe, that the full panoply of constitutional rights should be applied
to the sentencing process., 98 It reasoned that presentencing reports
are compiled in a non adversarial context, and their main purpose is
to provide courts with information which is used to decide a sentence. 99 The court saw no reason for mandatory disclosure of presentencing reports provided that the defendant had an opportunity to present any relevant evidence, and the court had the ability to resolve
any disparities.' 0 0
The New York Court of Appeals recently decided whether
evidence of latent fingerprint comparison reports prepared by experts
who did not testify at trial were " 'testimonial' statements within the
meaning of Crawford."'0 1 People v. Rawlins was a consolidation of
two cases: People v. Rawlins and People v. Meekins. 10 2 In Rawlins,
the defendant was convicted of six counts of burglary and sentenced
as a persistent felony offender.'0

3

Rawlins was arrested after burglar-

izing a florist in midtown Manhattan on May 5, 2003.104 A police officer had obtained five latent prints from the store's cash register, and
Detective Arthur Connolly, a fingerprint examiner, later matched one

97 New York v. Perry, 324 N.E.2d 878, 879 (N.Y. 1975).
98 Id. at 880.
99 Id. at 881.

100 Id.
1o1 People v. Rawlins (Rawlins II), 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y. 2008).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 id.
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of the prints with the defendant's fingerprints. 105
Prior to the robbery on May 5, 2003, police officers had responded to five other burglaries in Manhattan, and in each burglary
the police had lifted latent fingerprints which Detective Connolly was
later able to match to defendant's fingerprints. 10 6 Prior to Detective
Connolly's assignment to the cases, another detective, Artis Beatty,
had performed latent fingerprint comparison reports for two of the
robbery incidents, which were later admitted as business records at
trial.'0 7 Connolly testified that he had independently compared the
fingerprints pertaining to those robberies, and had agreed with
Beatty's conclusion.' 0 8 Rawlins challenged the admission of Beatty's
reports because Beatty did not testify at trial. 10 9 Rawlins motioned to
set aside the conviction for insufficiency, but the Supreme Court denied his motion and Rawlins was subsequently sentenced as a persistent felony offender. 10 The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the decision, holding that "although Beatty did not testify, his
'reports qualified as nontestimonial business records . . . [because
they] were not prepared for the specific purpose of litigation.' ,,'1'

The New York Court of Appeals noted that the Sixth
Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right

. . .

to be confronted with the witnesses against

Id.
Rawlins II, 884 N.E.2d at 1022-23.
"07 Id. at 1023.

105
106

108 Id.
109 Id.

110 Id.

111 Rawlins II, 884 N.E.2d at 1024 (quoting People v. Rawlins (Rawlins 1), 829 N.Y.S.2d
79, 81 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2007)).
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him," and that the New York Constitution contains similar wording.1 12 The court discussed the Supreme Court's analysis of police
interrogations in its decision in Davis."13 It quoted Davis for the
proposition that statements made in the context of police interrogations are nontestimonial when made for the purpose of" 'enabl[ing]
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,' " whereas statements made for the purpose of" 'prov[ing] past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution' " are testimonial.'

14

Thus,

Davis' "primary purpose" test distinguishes between "statement[s]..
. that [accuse] a perpetrator of a crime" and those which "serve...
nontestimonial purpose[s]."'

15

Rawlins argued that the fingerprint reports were unmistakably
testimonial because they were prepared by Detective Beatty solely
for the objective of prosecution, and because they were accusatory
and used to ascertain Rawlins' identity."

6

The Court of Appeals

agreed that Beatty's fingerprint reports were undoubtedly testimonial
because they were inherently accusatory and were used to prove that
Rawlins had committed the robberies.

17

The court reasoned that the

purpose behind gathering the latent fingerprints and comparing them
with known prints was to apprehend the perpetrator, and that the detective had no other expectations when making his reports." 8 However, the court ultimately concluded that the "admission of Beatty's
112 Id. at 1025 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI) (emphasis added).
113 Id. at 1026. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
114 Rawlins II, 884 N.E.2d at 1026 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
115 Id. at 1027.
116

Id. at 1033.

117 I .

18 Id.
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reports was harmless error" because Detective Connolly, who had
testified at trial, had compared the same fingerprints and reached the
same conclusion.11 9 Though the court determined that the fingerprint
reports at issue were, in fact, testimonial evidence, 120 the court never
reached the issue of whether using the evidence of the fingerprint reports at Rawlins' sentencing violated his right to confrontation.
In Leon, the New York Court of Appeals, in addition to having to decide the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause issue, had
to decide whether New York's CPL 400.15(7)(a) incorporates the
right of confrontation in a sentencing hearing. 12

Inherent in that is-

sue was whether the right of confrontation, as found in the New York
Constitution, applies at sentencing hearings. Leon argued that the
statute's requirement that evidence at a persistent violent offender's
hearing be subjected to "the rules applicable to a trial of the issue of
122
guilt" granted in the right of confrontation.
The Court of Appeals determined that the legislature did not
intend such a broad interpretation of CPL 400.15(7)(a). 123 Even after
the legislature had passed CPL 400.15, testimonial hearsay continued
to be admitted "both at trial and predicate felony hearings.,

124

The

New York Court of Appeals further reasoned that because it did not
believe that Crawford applies at sentencing hearings, it would not

119 Rawlins II, 884 N.E.2d at 1034.
120 Id. at 1033.
12a Leon
122

Id.

123

Id.

I, 884 N.E.2d at 1039.

124 Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss4/8

16

Katz and Klotz: CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

1173

CONFRONTA TION CLA USE

2009]

construe CPL 400.15 as permitting the opposite result.

25

The court

noted that while the other hearsay statutes work in tandem, construing CPL 400.15 in a manner as suggested by defendant would create
an unworkable result.1 26 When the court ruled that Sixth Amend1 27
ment's Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing hearings,
it was, by analogy, also implying that the New York Constitution's
right to confrontation, which contains nearly identical wording, is
128
also not implicated at sentencing hearings.
New York has chosen a narrow interpretation of Crawford,
determining that Crawford applies only at the trial level.129 Since
sentencing hearings are not trial prosecutions, Crawford does not
provide a guaranteed right to confrontation at them. 130 Though New
York's interpretation of Crawford is consistent with the majority of
the other federal circuit courts who have considered the issue,' 31 it
does little to relieve the defendant who has been denied the ability to
cross-examine a witness at a crucial sentencing hearing.
In the case of a defendant, like that in Leon, in which the defendant was denied the ability to confront a witness who presented
key evidence bearing on his sentencing, 132 the fact that the evidence
was presented at a hearing to determine his jail term, rather than at a
125 Id.
126

Leon II, 884 N.E.2d at 1039.

127 id.
128

See U.S.

CONST.

amend. VI, which states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecu-

tions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.";
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, states, in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court whatever the party
accused shall be allowed to... be confronted with the witnesses against him ......
129 Leon 1H, 884 N.E.2d at 1039.
130

Id.

131 Id.
132

Id. at 1038.
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hearing to determine his guilt, should not be determinative. The fact
remains that the defendant is denied the ability to challenge evidence
that implicates him in a crime. 133 It would seem that the spirit of both
the Sixth Amendment, which states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...to be confronted with the
witnesses against him" and of the New York Constitution, which
states that "[i]n any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall
be allowed to ...be confronted with the witnesses against him" is ul34
timately defeated by such a result.1
Perhaps, to obtain a more equitable result for defendants, New
York courts should focus on the nature of the evidence at issue, specifically whether the evidence is testimonial or nontestimonial, as
suggested by the Supreme Court in Davis,135 rather than focusing on
the nature of the court proceeding, and whether it is a trial or a sentencing hearing. However, in view of the fact that New York is supported by the majority of courts in refusing to provide the right to
confrontation at sentencing hearings, this change is not likely to occur any time soon.
Madeline Klotz

131 Id.

at 1039.
134See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
...547 U.S. at 822.
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Katz and Klotz: CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

EQUAL PROTECTION
United States Constitution Amendment XIV:
No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
New York Constitution article I, section 11:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this
state or any subdivision thereof No person shall, because of race,
color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his or
her civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or
institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.
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